The Moral Imperative to Preserve by Cloonan, Mich??le V.
Abstract
This article introduces the concept of monumental preservation, which 
the author deﬁnes as the preservation of all cultural phenomena, 
because from the smallest item to the greatest monument all things 
emanate from and reﬂect culture. The imperative to preserve monu-
ments is the imperative to preserve our cultural heritage. Whether 
there is a moral responsibility to preserve cultural heritage may be 
considered from philosophical, political, and legal perspectives.
The preservation of cultural heritage1 has been around for millennia, as 
illustrated by the biblical passage “take these evidences . . . and put them in 
an earthen vessel, that they may continue for many days” (  Jeremiah 32:14).2 
Many similar references to the preservation or safe-keeping of artifacts exist 
in literature. One recent author has gone so far as to say that “[t]he Human 
Being is a repairing animal. Repair is ubiquitous, something we engage in 
every day and in almost every dimension of our lives. Homo sapiens is also 
Homo reparans” (Spelman, 2002, p. 1).
But equally forceful as the impulse to preserve is the impulse to destroy. 
History is strewn with countless examples—-as the destruction of the Al-
exandrian Library in the fourth century ad or the destruction of the Na-
tional and University Library of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992 vividly 
and poignantly demonstrate. Sometimes destruction occurs in the name 
of preservation. Perhaps the most cited example is the Elgin Marbles, the 
Phidian sculptures from the Parthenon. In the process of supposedly lib-
erating the marbles from Greece, Lord Elgin’s workers broke or destroyed 
a number of them. They had to destroy the original ediﬁce to “preserve” 
some of its parts.3
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Preservation and destruction do not necessarily constitute a dualism: 
one may wish to preserve one’s own heritage while destroying someone 
else’s. War is the best example of these opposing impulses. However, as 
some historians have observed, sometimes destruction is part of the cycle by 
which societies rebuild themselves (Lowenthal, 2002). The issue, however, 
is not what the rebuilding yields but what is lost in the destruction. What 
role do curators, librarians, archivists, and other citizens play in protecting 
cultural heritage when—-and if—-it should be protected? In an interna-
tional context, do we all have a moral imperative to preserve?
I have coined the term monumental preservation to encompass the preser-
vation of everything that deﬁnes culture. It is preservation writ large, and 
it intentionally covers everything: records, works of art, natural habitats, 
and national living treasures, to name a few. Preservation tries to assure the 
survival of the human record. It is not just a technical or managerial activity; 
it is a social, political, and cultural activity as well (Cloonan, 2001). In this 
article it will refer to everything that can, theoretically, be preserved.
If preservation assures cultural survival, is there a concomitant moral 
imperative to preserve? To try to establish whether there exists such an 
imperative, we need a working deﬁnition of moral. The dictionary offers 
several. The two most germane to this discussion are “of or concerned with 
the judgment of the goodness or badness of human action and character; 
a moral quandary; and, conforming to standards of what is right or just in 
behavior.” Moral obligation is deﬁned as “arising from conscience or the 
sense of right or wrong.”4 These deﬁnitions introduce mineﬁelds: whose 
standards of right or wrong, bad or good? Whose conscience? And whose 
convictions? And on what is the judgment based? Religious, economic, 
nationalistic, or other precepts?
The writings of the eighteenth-century philosopher Immanuel Kant 
concerning morals and morality have been a touchstone and a ﬂashpoint 
for philosophers.5 Kant believed that there was a duty to be moral, which he 
discussed within his framework of “the categorical imperative.” Inherent in 
his principle of morality is the idea that it “involves its own universal validity 
for every rational being” (Frankena & Granrose, 1974, p. 112). In other 
words, moral obligation derives from reason and not from God, humans, or 
communities. Since Kant, philosophers have focused on either an ethics of 
duty (action, principles, and laws) or an ethics of virtue (being, character, 
and ideals) (Frankena & Granrose, 1974, p. 224). Kant’s writings remain 
the most inﬂuential attempt to justify universal moral principles without a 
theological framework.
R. M. Hare, a twentieth-century philosopher, focused on the role of 
rational moral judgments to prescribe courses of action. He described 
morality as
the endeavor of a free agent to ﬁnd for himself principles which he can 
accept as binding on all alike. . . . it is safe to say that by far the greatest 
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number of people slip up in their moral thinking through ignorance or 
neglect of the facts. But secondly, they have to give as much weight to 
the interests of these other people as to their own interests; for unless 
they do, they will not be universalizing their prescriptions. (Frankena 
& Granrose, 1974, pp. 420–21)6
“Universalizing prescriptions” is an idea that I will return to later in the 
context of political theory.
Can moral philosophy guide us in the realm of preservation? Since the 
mid-twentieth century some philosophers have focused on public moral-
ity. In 1971 a group of philosophers—-precipitated by the starvation tak-
ing place in Bangladesh (then, Bengali East Pakistan)—-considered moral 
obligation as it applied to world hunger (Aiken & La Follette, 1977).7 As 
far as I know, this is as close as philosophical debate on the moral impera-
tive of preservation comes. The essays these philosophers wrote are closely 
related to the current discussion. Peter Singer, in particular, holds the 
moral principle that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from 
happening, without sacriﬁcing anything of moral comparable value, we 
ought, morally, to do so.
The moral obligation to preserve cultural heritage can perhaps be viewed 
as an extension of helping the starving. Besides needing food, “people crave 
knowledge of their past and the certainty that there will be a continuity of 
their cultural-individual selves after they die. If they lose their . . . cultural 
heritage, they lose their past and the possibility of a connection to the time 
beyond them.”8
The perspectives I have described reﬂect Western thought. There are 
many distinct moral and ethical precepts that help to inform the decisions 
we make as caretakers of objects from cultures with different intellectual 
and cultural traditions. At the same time, different cultures do have ethical 
precepts in common. If they did not, cooperation among cultures would be 
impossible. Still, sensitivity to differences is critical to the underpinning of 
an international preservation community. I introduce these Western deﬁ-
nitions with the idea of presenting a framework that will help focus some 
of our thinking about the moral obligation to preserve. It follows that we 
must always be open to diverse cultural norms. For example, David Lowen-
thal (2002, p. 21) quotes a Zuni spokesman who says that “Everything for 
ceremonial, religious, and ritual purposes that my culture makes, is meant 
to disintegrate. . . . to go back into the ground. Conservation is a disservice 
to my culture,” while Sherelyn Ogden (2004) describes working with tribal 
curators and conservators to develop preservation strategies.
The twentieth century, a time of maturation for the ﬁelds of preserva-
tion and conservation, was also perhaps one of the bloodiest centuries on 
record. It is ironic that the period that fostered new technologies to aid 
conservation for paper records in danger of deterioration or damage was 
also the century that hosted two world wars and many other world con-
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ﬂicts. The number of items destroyed over the last hundred years probably 
exceeds the number saved.
It is no coincidence that the terms genocide and libricide were coined 
in the twentieth century. A number of writers, including Rebecca Knuth 
(2003) and András Riedlmayer (1995), have chronicled instances in which 
libricide facilitated genocide: to exterminate races or tribes, so as to leave 
no trace, you must obliterate all material expressions of their cultures. 
While libricide has probably accompanied genocide for centuries, Knuth 
points out that “modern communication systems now convey images and 
texts that give unﬂinching testimony to violence that might otherwise be 
hidden from the world” (Knuth, 2003, p. 6).9
In the nineteenth century “the concept of cultural, historic and archi-
tectural heritage, viewed as the common heritage of a group or commu-
nity came into existence” (Lopez, 2002, p. 6),10 though as far back as the 
Crusades jurists were already considering the obligation to protect cultural 
monuments in times of war (Boylan, 2001). Yet the rise of nationalism 
(Sieyès, 1789) —-the belief that nations beneﬁt from acting independently 
rather than collectively11—-over the past two centuries has simultaneously 
helped and hindered preservation. When sovereign states rose from former 
empires and kingdoms, national identity and self-determination followed. 
Since the self-interests of individual nations often dictate that national 
rather than international goals take priority, cultural monuments might be 
expropriated or intentionally destroyed for national interests. Nationalism, 
ideally, embraces pluralism—- a condition in which distinct religious, ethnic, 
and cultural groups can coexist. When nations do not embrace pluralism, 
the result can lead to xenophobia or ethnic cleansing, which undermine 
monumental preservation. (One need look no further than to American 
history and our treatment of Native Americans, their sacred sites, and even 
their bones.) Since pluralism, at present, is under attack all over the world, 
cultural heritage continues to be vulnerable.
To be universalizing, nationalism must be more moderate; it must em-
brace the concept that nations are part of a global community. This raises 
other issues: what is the obligation of an individual nation to all other 
nations? And is any given nation a voluntary or involuntary member of a 
larger group of nations?12
Cosmopolitanism takes the broader view that “one’s primary moral ob-
ligations are directed to all human beings (regardless of geographical or 
cultural distance) and, political arrangements should faithfully reﬂect this 
universal moral obligation (in the form of international organizations that 
take precedence over nation-states).”13 That is, the greatest good for the 
greatest number trumps the greatest good for any one state. It would be 
utopian indeed if all nations operated on this “law.” But, as with individual 
people, individual nations have always taken the stance “Is it good for me? 
How can I beneﬁt the most?” and most nations have behaved this way, de-
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spite the fact that they are signatories to international conventions—-and 
despite the fact that, in so operating, other countries are hurt. This will 
not work if we are to preserve the cultures of all.
Here it is useful to consider two theoretical views of international rela-
tions: realism and interdependence. Realism generally aligns itself with 
nationalism: an extreme example of this thinking is that the morals you 
adhere to in your own country may not apply to other countries.14 In other 
words, realists hold that “moral norms do not apply to the conduct of 
states, which should instead be guided exclusively by a concern for national 
interest” (McMahan, 1993, p. 384). Interdependence, on the other hand, 
recognizes “contemporary world politics . . . not [as] a seamless web; [but 
as] a tapestry of diverse relationships” (Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. 4). In this 
view, averting war or man-made ecological disasters requires collective ac-
tion, and interdependence is not limited to situations of mutual beneﬁt.
The cosmopolitan or interdependence perspectives make possible the 
work of international organizations like the United Nations (UN). The pur-
pose of the UN is to “preserve peace through international cooperation and 
collective security.”15 For the most part, the UN respects the sovereignty of 
individual regimes without necessarily monitoring their policies. Its cultural 
agency, UNESCO, is the world body with oversight for the protection of 
world heritage. Cosmopolitanism also spawns nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), which do much on-the-ground preservation work.
This takes us back to Hare’s universal prescriptivism that accounts for 
collective as well as individual moral authority. It also gives credence to the 
idea of the “wisdom of the ages” because such wisdom is “the result of the 
thought of a great many people in diverse situations” (Hare, 1991). If Hare’s 
ideas are applied to the UN or UNESCO—-forums that allow for the diverse 
perspectives of diverse constituencies—-then protection of human lives 
or cultural objects can conceivably be accomplished. This is an important 
concept: if universal principles are rejected, then the human rights move-
ment or the protection of cultural heritage will languish because it will be 
impossible to move beyond the interests of particular societies.
Monumental preservation is contingent upon the ongoing, though at 
times precarious, balance of international relations. Cultural heritage is 
protected through conventions, laws, and treaties, as well as documents 
that have moral rather than legal authority such as charters, principles, 
and codes of ethics. But, as history has shown repeatedly, even agreements 
among countries that carry legal authority—-such as the Hague Conven-
tion—-are violated over and over again.
The preservation of cultural heritage has long depended on legal docu-
ments, for example, the nineteenth-century Lieber Code (1863)16 and the 
original Hague Convention. Dozens, if not hundreds, of relevant documents 
were created in the twentieth century.17 One pre–nineteenth-century inﬂu-
ence on later conventions and charters was Emmerich de Vattel’s Law of 
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Nations (1758). Although not written explicitly to address cultural property 
issues, de Vattel sets forth propositions that underlie such later documents 
as the Hague Convention—-namely, that nations unite for the purpose of 
“promoting their mutual safety,” that nations are “susceptible of obligations 
and rules,” and that there are rights among nations (de Vattel, 1789). Vattel 
stressed that, in the interests of mankind, when possible, cultural property 
should be spared in time of war. An early example of de Vattel’s principles 
at work was the 1815 Congress of Vienna. Under the terms of the Congress, 
France was compelled to return to the Venetians the gilded bronze statues 
seized by Napoleon.
The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conﬂict originated with the Hague Peace Conference of 
1899. Although other conventions superceded parts of the original treaty, 
the Hague Convention, modiﬁed several times, continues in force. The 
recently added 1999 protocol provides for “exceptional protection” of sig-
niﬁcant sites, monuments, and institutions. Signiﬁcantly, extradition for 
some crimes against cultural property is now possible. Although the United 
States is not a signatory,18 it remains bound by the earlier Hague Conven-
tions. The Convention requires that combatants safeguard and respect 
cultural property. UNESCO maintains a list of monuments that are under 
special immunity from attack.
Another recent document, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Sto-
len or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, sponsored by the International 
Institute for the Uniﬁcation of Private Law, is intended to protect stolen 
objects in times of peace as well as in war.19 This document complements 
the Hague Convention—-and it is equally challenging to enforce given the 
robustness of illegal trafﬁcking in stolen art.
Although conventions, charters, treaties, and the like are documents 
that carry moral and legal weight, some cultural heritage professionals have 
worried that the rapid proliferation of such documents has led to confusion 
and even to contradictions. In some cases, documents are so general they 
can be interpreted differently by various parties. Further, these documents 
are not always well disseminated, which minimizes their chance for broad 
implementation (Luxen, 2004, p. 4).
In 1996 a group of cultural heritage professionals representing the In-
ternational Council on Archives, the International Council of Museums, 
the International Council on Monuments and Sites, and the International 
Federation of Library Associations and Institutions started the International 
Community of the Blue Shield (ICBS). The Blue Shield is the symbol speci-
ﬁed in the 1954 Hague Convention for marking cultural sites, and it was 
envisioned as a Red Cross for the protection of cultural heritage.
However, a point of contention is whether or not to mark cultural sites 
with the blue shield logo to signal their protected status in the event of 
armed conﬂict. Some fear that marking monuments identiﬁes them as 
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ready targets for hostile forces (Luxen, 2004, p. 4). ICBS argues that the 
risk is worth taking because otherwise they might not receive full protec-
tion (MacKenzie, 2002 and 2003, p. 17). The Blue Shield defenders also 
point out that the Red Cross itself is sometimes targeted but that the ben-
eﬁts of having these organizations outweigh the risks. The critics of the 
Blue Shield initiative have a point. The very act of labeling something as 
heritage distinguishes it from other objects and can therefore enhance 
its value. On the other hand, we privilege objects all the time by placing 
them in museums or exhibits. As long as we recognize the signiﬁcance of 
an object or place value on it, it is at risk. Those out to destroy another’s 
heritage will have marked targets. Adherents of the Blue Shield approach 
wager that more good than harm will come of identifying the value and 
signiﬁcance of certain monuments.
Thus far the forces of good and the forces of malfeasance or terrorism 
are in play, and the terrorists have not always been adequately kept in check. 
One need only draw on the example of the destruction of the Buddhas 
in Bamiyan, Afghanistan, in 2001. Yet, even if international intervention 
was not successful in that instance, if we are to preserve monuments we 
must do so through a coalition of all peoples and through local, as well as 
global, action. Philosopher John Rawls (1971) would probably assert that 
principles of “right action” are justiﬁable for their own sake, independent 
of the amount of good that the just actions result in.
International law, professional practice, and the concern of the general 
public seem to point to the existence of a moral imperative to preserve. 
After a natural disaster such as the 2004 tsunamis or Hurricane Katrina, 
governments, NGOs, and individual citizens mobilized quickly to try to 
mitigate the long-term damage to libraries, archives, and museums, as well 
as dealing with the immediate needs of people and communities for shel-
ter, food, and communications. When victims of disasters are interviewed 
they often lament the loss of their family photos more than the loss of 
their dwellings because their dwellings are replaceable. There seems to 
be an almost instinctive need for individuals to preserve their own per-
sonal histories. Today there is a growing emphasis on community-based 
preservation. In Chile they have a term for this: mingaco, an Indian word 
that signiﬁes collective preservation.20 Put another way, it is the notion of 
cultural stewardship. In the words of a political scientist who has written 
extensively on human rights,
Culture is a very deep part of individuality. To assure the dignity and 
well-being of future generations we need to safeguard culture. Monu-
ments are a visual library of our human as well as our spiritual passage 
in all of its fullness—-good and evil. It is always cultural monuments 
that are under attack in political conﬂicts—-and for a very good reason; 
[to destroy cultural objects creates] a blow to society and to peoples’ 
sense of security and identity.21
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However we choose to deﬁne morality, it has an important role to play 
in monumental preservation. Contemporary philosophers are address-
ing the functioning of morality in the context of such global concerns 
as the environment and the prevention of nuclear war. The preservation 
of cultural heritage—-monumental preservation—-is a concern that ﬁts 
alongside these others for the reasons that I suggest. But as forceful as a 
moral stance may sometimes be, it is still subject to war, terrorism, natural 
disasters, technological obsolescence, and the innate human desire to em-
power oneself at the expense of others. It is perhaps this last vulnerability 
that is most difﬁcult to overcome.
“The rules of the game include some national rules, some international 
rules, some private rules—-and large areas of no rules at all.” This observa-
tion by Susan Strange in “Economic Power and Who Has It?” (1975) applies 
aptly to preservation. The protection of cultural heritage has been attended 
to in international conventions, laws, and treaties, but it is the “large areas 
of no rules at all” that continue to challenge us.
Notes
 1. The title refers to a talk by Librarian of Congress James H. Billington titled “The Moral 
Imperative of Conservation,” which was ﬁrst delivered at the Art Institute of Chicago on 
June 16, 1987, and was again presented to the Association of Research Libraries (ARL) 
October 22, 1987, meeting. It was published in Merrill-Oldham (1988, pp. 5–12). Despite 
the title of this article, it is a meditation on cultural memory and the role of conserva-
tion and preservation in sustaining cultural heritage. He discusses cultural values and 
preservation, but does not consider “moral issues.”
 2.  In some other versions of the Bible, “many days” is translated as “for a long time.”
 3. In Innocents Abroad Mark Twain talks about a practice of pilgrims to the Holy Land who 
chopped off pieces of famous buildings for their records of their travel. In a way, like Lord 
Elgin with the marbles, they were taking home artifacts to preserve memory. But in so 
doing, they were destroying that which needed preservation from them. On one side, the 
original is deteriorating in order to preserve memories of the excursion, of the experi-
ence. On the other side, this “preservation” of memory creates an urgency to preserve 
that which they are trying to remember. It is two kinds of preservation.
 4. The American Heritage Dictionary (4th ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifﬂin, 2000.
 5. See in particular Kant (1964). Contemporary philosophers, including W. D. Ross (1974), 
have been highly critical of Kant’s logic. Frankena and Granrose (1974) have reprinted 
an excerpt from Ross’s Foundations of Ethics and titled the excerpt “Criticism of Kant.” 
Bernard Mayo wrote, “It has been said that the whole of Western philosophy is a set of 
footnotes to Plato. . . . And modern ethics is a set of footnotes, not to Plato, but to Kant, 
and, more remotely, to the Old Testament and Roman Law” (Frankena & Granrose, 1974, 
p. 231).
 6. I am also drawing on Hare (1972).
 7. Thanks to Diane Raymond for making these essays known to me.
 8. M. G. Bouvard, in an e-mail to the author, October 17, 2005.
 9. According to Knuth, Raphael Lemkin coined genocide in the 1930s to refer to the murder 
of whole races and tribes; the term was adopted by the United Nations in 1946. Libricide is 
“the regime-sponsored, ideologically driven destruction of books and libraries” (Knuth, 
2003 p. 5).
10. Though this publication is intended for young adults, the author has presented the mate-
rial in sufﬁcient detail that it is useful for a general audience.
11. American Heritage Dictionary, 1171.
12. There are also many other factors, including religious ones, but they are beyond the scope 
of this article.
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13.  “Nationalism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, p. 13 (retrieved October 5, 2005, 
from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nationalism).
14. Adherents to this view include Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz. For the perspective 
of interdependence see Keohane and Nye (2001). Under the George W. Bush administra-
tion, realism has dominated the U.S. approach to international “diplomacy.”
15. See the United Nations home page: http://www.un.org (retrieved on October 5, 2005).
16. Francis Lieber’s Code was issued as Instructions for the Governance of Armies of the United States 
in the Field, General Orders No. 100 on April 24, 1863; later it was simply called the Lieber 
Code. The text is available at http://www.civilwarhome.com/libercode.htm (retrieved 
on October 10, 2005).
17. For a comprehensive list, see Boylan (2001).
18. According to Arlene Krimgold Fleming (1996), “The United States is not a party to the 
Hague Convention, reportedly because, during the Cold War, the government was unwill-
ing to promise not to bomb the Kremlin, a listed cultural monument.”
19. International Institute for the Uniﬁcation of Private Law, ratiﬁed on June 25, 1995. See 
http://www.unidroit.or/english/conventions/c-main.htm (retrieved on October 10, 
2005).
20. I was introduced to this concept at the International Federation of Library Associations 
and Institutions, which was held in Buenos Aires in 2004. At panel no. 107 (August 25), 
“Preservation and Conservation with Audiovisual and Multimedia,” Antonieta Palma 
discussed this concept in her talk, “Los Archivos Sonoros y Audiovisuales de Chile.”
21. M. G. Bouvard in e-mail correspondence with the author, April 21, 2005, and October 
17, 2005.
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